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The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service Goes Public:
The Litigative Use of the Freedom of
Information Act *
LEON WILDES**
Had it not been for a certain rock musician and former Beatle
named John Lennon, an article on the nonpriority program might
never have been written. The research required a plaintiff willing
to patiently await the outcome of numerous administrative requests
for information and then to pursue a suit under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).1 The entire program was so shrouded in
secrecy that a former District Director of the Immigration and
* The statistical study of the Immigration Service's nonpriority pro-
gram was previously published. Wildes, The NonprioritV Program of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service-A Measure of the Attorney Gen-
era's Concern for Aliens, 53 INTERPRn'r RELEASES 25 (1976).
** Leon Wildes, B.A., Yeshiva University; J.D. & LL.M., New York Uni-
versity School of Law; New York immigration attorney; past president of
the National Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers. He rep-
resented John Lennon and Yoko Ono in their five-year long battle with
the Immigration Service. The author wishes to acknowledge the contribu-
tion of Mr. David Grunblatt, a student at New York University Law School,
who assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974).
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Naturalization Service (INS) actually denied the existence of the
program. The Operations Instruction2 embodying the procedure
was buried in the Blue Sheets, the INS internal regulations never
made available to the public. The situation was a classic example
of secret law.
The purpose of this article is to make the practicing bar more
fully aware of the nonpriority program. In addition, this article
will describe how the FOIA can be used as an information gathering
device and as a litigation tool.
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Perhaps no amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act has
had so profound an effect on administrative law as the FOIA. Since
its passage in 1967, veritable mountains of documents, internal op-
erating instructions, and federal agencies' procedural rules have
been made public. Although in the short span of nine years, an en-
tire body of new law has developed around the FOIA, only the sur-
face issues have been dealt with. It has been conceded without ar-
gument3 that the primary purpose of the FOIA is to make available
to the public the records, rules, and internal workings of federal
agencies. The issue which remains unresolved is the extent of the
new rights which have been created for members of the public in-
volved in litigation. This question was raised in litigation between
John Lennon and the INS.
4
2. INS, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION § 103.1(a) (1) (ii) (April 30, 1975).
See note 32 infra.
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICnr ATTOmNEY GmERA's MmVoRANDum ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 1
(1967).
4. Lennon's difficulties with the INS resulted in three district court ac-
tions as well as a Petition for Review before the court of appeals:
A. Lennon v. Marks, Civil No. 72-1784 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 1,
1972), was a suit for an injunction compelling the INS to act
upon Lennon's third preference petition. A third preference
petition for an immigrant visa is filed by an Eastern Hemi-
sphere alien involved in a profession or the arts. 8 U.S.C. §
1153 (a) (3) (1970), as amended, Immigration, and Nationality
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 4 (Oct. 20,
1976). For a discussion of the 1976 Amendment, see After-
word: The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1976, 14 SAN DmEo L. REV. 326 (1976). See also Comment,
How to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical Guide
for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193 (1976). The suit
Lennon came to the United States as a visitor in August 1971, and
was permitted to remain until late February 1972. At that time the
INS instituted deportation proceedings against him as an alleged
overstay.5 Lennon claimed that the proceedings were instituted for
political reasons. Among other things, he requested a grant of non-
priority status.
Nonpriority status is a euphemism for an administrative stay of
deportation which effectively places an otherwise deportable alien
in a position where he is not removed simply because his case has
the lowest possible priority for INS action. Traditionally, the status
was accorded to aliens whose departure from the United States
would result in extreme hardship. Lennon and artist Yoko Ono, his
wife, had come to this country to fight contested custody proceed-
accomplished its purpose and became moot when the Immigra-
tion Service acted upon Lennon's petition within hours of the
filing of the action in the district court.
B. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), was
an action brought under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 522 (1966), to obtain Immigration Service records
detailing the program and procedures relating to the granting
of nonpriority status.
C. Lennon v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
was a suit to enjoin Lennon's deportation on the ground that
he had been singled out because of his political beliefs and to
seek other relief.
D. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975), was a petition for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals decision uphold-
ing the deportation order against Lennon. A petition for re-
view is the device for obtaining judicial review of a final ad-
ministrative order of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (a) (1970).
Ultimately, the deportation order against Lennon was reversed by the Sec-
ond Circuit in a 2 to 1 decision written by Chief Judge Irving Kauf-
man. The court held that petitioner's guilty plea in London in 1968 to a
charge of possessing cannabis resin in violation of the British Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1965, C.15, § 4(I) (A); Dangerous Drugs (No. 2) Regulations
§§ 3 & 9 (1964), STAT. INsm. 1964 No. 1811, which makes possession of a
narcotic unlawful even if the possessor does not know the illicit nature of
what he possesses, does not amount to a conviction under a "law or regula-
tion relating to the illicit possession of ... marijuana" within the meaning
of section 212 (a) (23) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (a) (23) (1970). The case was remanded to the Service to determine
Lennon's eligibility as a matter of discretion. On July 27, 1976, a hearing
was held before Immigration Judge Fieldsteel immediately after which
Lennon was granted residence, culminating his five-year struggle against
the INS.
Another action had been contemplated against the Senate Internal Se-
curity Committee for withholding documents relating to the selective prose-
cution of Lennon. Although congressional committees are exempt from
FOIA disclosure, Lennon would have argued that the documents requested
originated from executive sources and could not be protected from dis-
closure by being sent to a Senate Committee. See Comment, Immigration
Law and Procedure-Excludability-Conviction Under British Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1965 is not a Conviction Under a Law Prohibiting "Illicit
Possession" Within the Meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act, §
212(a), 11 Tmc. INxuL L.J. 345 (1976).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (1970).
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ings concerning Kyoko, Ono's daughter by a prior marriage. Len-
non and Ono were completely successful on the law, with courts in
several jurisdictions awarding them custody of Kyoko. However
the father absconded with the child and could not be found. In the
midst of the frantic search for the child, Lennon and Ono were sub-
jected to expulsion proceedings. They felt, accordingly, that the
equities involved in their continued search for the child justified the
application for nonpriority status. Hardship notwithstanding, non-
priority status was never even given consideration, and the deporta-
tion proceedings relentlessly advanced.0
Commencing on May 1, 1972, through extensive correspondence
with the INS, Lennon made every conceivable effort to obtain the
records relevant to nonpriority procedures before instituting suit in
federal court. However, after more than a year's correspondence,
the records were not forthcoming.7 In fact, the Service stated that
the data about nonpriority cases were "not compiled" although at
no time did it deny the existence of either a nonpriority program or
relevant records.8 Lennon's demands, made pursuant to the FOIA,9
6. Wildes, United States Immigration Service v. John Lennon: The
Cultural Lag, 40 BRooKLYN L. REv. 270 (1973).
7. The first request for records relating to the nonpriority program was
made on May 1, 1972, to Sol Marks, the district director in New York who
is now retired. Subsequent correspondence continued with both the district
director and the central office in Washington. As of the date of this writing,
a request for data regarding denied nonpriority applications is pending.
8. Perhaps the best way to describe the attitude of the Service is one
of passive resistance.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970). Note that this action was instituted
prior to the 1974 amendment to the FOIA which had among its purposes
assuring prompt compliance by the agency with requests for information
under the FOIA:
(6) (A) Each agency upon any request for records made under
paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection shall-
(i) determine within ten days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays
and legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such re-
quest whether to comply with such request and shall im-
mediately notify the person making such request of such de-
termination and the reason therefore, and of the right of
such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse
determination; and
(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within
twenty days (except Saturdays, Sundays and legal public
holidays) after the receipt of such appeal. If after appeal
the denial of a request for records is in whole or in part
upheld, the agency shall notify the person making such re-
quest of the provisions for judicial review of that deter-
mination under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
Id. § 552(a) (6) (A) (1974).
continued until August 1973, with no response from the Service.
In his deportation proceedings, Lennon moved to depose a Gov-
ernment witness with knowledge of the program. His motion was
rejected, however, because the immigration judge thought it irrele-
vant to any issue over which he could rule.10 Finally, when at-
tempts to obtain the records through regular administrative chan-
nels failed, an action was instituted in district court, requesting in-
junctive relief pursuant to section (a) (3) of the FOIA.11 The suit
was filed within a short time after filing a companion action against
certain Government officials. The companion suit sought a hearing
to determine whether such officials had conspired to prejudge animmigration case, to prejudge various applications for discretionary
relief and the premature commencement of deportation proceedings
against the plaintiff.1 2 Among the wrongs alleged was the Govern-
ment's unexplained failure to consider Lennon's request for nonpri-
ority classification.
Section (a) (1) of the FOIA provides for publication in the Federal
Register of basic information on how agencies are organized and on
the rules which they follow in administrating their mandates. The
publication must include descriptions of central and field organiza-
tions of the agencies, statements of the general course or method by
which the agencies function, rules of procedure, descriptions of
available forms and places where they may be obtained, and sub-
stantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law.13 This section also provides that a person cannot be adversely
affected by "a matter required to be published in the Federal Regis-
ter and not so published.'1 4 Section (a) (2) requires that the fol-
lowing be made available for public inspection and copying: (A)
the final opinions made in the adjudication of cases; (B) interpreta-
tions which have been adopted but which have not been published
in the Federal Register;'5 and (C) administrative staff manuals
which could affect a member of the public.'6
When Lennon's FOIA action was instituted, the rules on nonpri-
ority classification were contained in an INS Operations Instruction
which was not available to the public. Subsequent to the action
and as a direct result of it, this Instruction was transferred from the
unpublished Blue Sheets to the published White Sheets.'7 The pub-
10. In re John Winston-Ono Lennon & Yoko-Ono Lennon, Civil No.
(BIA, 197 ) (unreported decision of Immigration Judge Fieldsteel).
11. Lennon v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
12. Id.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (1) (A)-(D) (1974).
14. Id. § (E).
15. Id. §§ (A) & (B).
16. Id. § (C).
17. The INS has available to the public in various district offices, includ-
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lication of this Operations Instruction was significant, for it was a
formal, public acknowledgement by the INS that such a program
existed. Even so, of much greater value to the litigant are the rec-
ords of those cases in which nonpriority status was granted or de-
nied. The records requested at the time of the action consisted of
periodic reports by district directors. Each time a nonpriority deci-
sion was made, the director had to record his reasons, forward his
recommendation or decision to his regional commissioner, who then
forwarded it to the Central Office in Washington, D.C., where an of-
ficer or a committee of officers acted on the decision and kept rec-
ords.'
8
Section (b) of the FOIA lists nine exceptions to the publication
requirements of section (a).19 Pursuant to section (c), exceptions
are expressly limited to those specifically stated in section (b).20
Attempts to expand this list of exceptions have failed.21 Thus, the
ing New York, and in the Central Office in Washington a volume containing
the Operations Instructions of the INS for its employees. However, not all
instructions are made available. Where a deletion has been made, Blue
Sheets are inserted in the volume. For the full provisions of the Operations
Instruction relating to the nonpriority program, see note 32 infra.
18. As is discussed infra, at text accompanying note 32, the Operations
Instruction has recently been revised so that nonpriority applications are
handled at the regional level rather than by a Central Office committee.
This change was instituted on April 30, 1975, as a result of the litigation
described herein.
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b) (1)-(9) (1974).
20. Id. § 552 (c).
21. Records excepted from disclosure are those:
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an ex-
ecutive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant
to such executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
INS could not argue that the records requested were exempt from
the provisions of section (a) of the FOIA. Even if such records
were termed Private Letter Rulings or Technical Service Mem-
oranda, they would not have been exempt from production and dis-
closure.22 An exemption in the FOIA protects "inter-agency or in-
tra-agency" memoranda or letters23 which would "not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency."24 This exemption was intended to encourage the free ex-
change of ideas during the policymaking process. It has been held
to protect internal communications consisting of advice, recommen-
dations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking
process, but not purely factual or investigative reports. 25  Factual
information may be protected only if it is inextricably intertwined
with the policymaking process. The courts do not view this excep-
tion expansively.
26
The nonpriority records were clearly a "class or category of docu-
ments" in the normal course of INS affairs. Therefore, the reports
had to be produced.27  In view of the arguments cited above, the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record com-
piled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful na-
tional security intelligence investigation, confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or safety of
law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency re-
sponsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions;
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
Id. § 552 (b).
The courts have consistently construed these exemptions narrowly and
deemed them exclusive. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of H-E.W., 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Montrose Chemical
Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robertson v. Butterfield, 498
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.
1975).
22. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. I.R.S., 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C.
1973), modified, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)'(5) (1974). See generally Note, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 I4Xv.
L. R v. 1047, 1057-63 (1973).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (5) (1974).
25. Grunman Aircraft Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir.
1970). See also Bristol-Meyers v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Ackerly v. Ley, 320 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. National Cable Television Ass'n v. F.T.C., 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Even if an agency has never segregated a class or category, publica-
tion is required when the agency may be able to identify that material with
reasonable effort. Even if the agency can demonstrate that the memoran-
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Government decided that its most appropriate course would be to
provide the plaintiff with the case histories of all extant approved
nonpriority cases-1843 in number. Thus, for the first time, both
the procedures and the records of all known approved cases were
made available to the public.
THE NoIpRioT PROGRAm
The Immigration Act's Failure to Deal with all Humanitarian
Problems
Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act)
28
lists thirty-one classes of excludable aliens who are inadmissible to
the United States.2 9 The provision, which has been characterized as
"labyrinthine,"3 0 actually prevents many aliens from permanently
settling in this country. With respect to certain grounds for exclu-
sion, waivers are available to those able to demonstrate hardship to
themselves, or to close relatives who are either United States citi-
zens or permanent residents. 31 Other aliens have no administrative
remedy available, in which case, the immutable provisions of the
law often mandate deportation. Aside from the general language
"shall," the Act is silent about whether the INS, which has been del-
egated full authority to deal with aliens, may permit aliens to re-
main on the basis of nonstatutory reasons. Because of the Act's
silence, the INS developed a secret program which it used to ameli-
orate the Act's stem provisions.
The following discussion will detail the operative factors in an
INS decision to invoke nonpriority status. The general rule is that
when an alien is otherwise deportable or excludable, the Service
dum involved is so intertwined with policymaking processes that disclosure
would violate the purpose of the exemption, the district court may resort
to in camera inspection of some or all the documents. See Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(4) (B) (1974).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1970).
29. Id. § 212(a). Furthermore, section 241(a) of the Immigration and
National Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970), as amended, Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 7 (Oct. 20, 1976), lists eight-
een grounds on which an alien present in the United States may be
deported.
30. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975). See Comment, supra
note 4.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970).
will use nonpriority status to avoid a result which on humanitarian
grounds would be unconscionable. The Service, aware that the
mechanical enforcement of the often harsh immigration laws and
regulations sometimes leads to great inequity, voluntarily devel-
oped this special category to safeguard against gross injustices.
What is a Nonpriority Case?
E. A. Loughran, former INS Associate Commissioner, Manage-
ment, defined a nonpriority case as:
one in which the Service in the exercise of discretion determines
that adverse action would be unconscionable because of appealing
humanitarian factors. Generally these cases are identified at an
early stage in Service processing and are not put under deportation
proceedings. However in a number of cases the appealing humani-
tarian factors may occur or be recognized after procedures have
been started. In the latter cases extended voluntary departure or
stays of deportation may be granted as appropriate.
32
The nonpriority category is not a haphazard, informal designa-
tion subject to the whim of any immigration officer. On the con-
32. The letter is an exhibit to the complaint in Lennon v. United States,
378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Letter from E.A. Loughran to L. Wildes,
July 17, 1973, on file with the San Diego Law Review.
The recently revised Operations Instruction provides that:
In every case where the district director determines that adverse
action would be unconscionable because of the existence of appeal-
ing humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for
nonpriority. His recommendation shall be made to the regional
commissioner concerned on Form G-312, which shall be signed per-
sonally by the district director. Interim or biennial reviews should
be conducted to determine whether approved cases be continued
or removed from nonpriority. (Revised)
When determining whether a case should be recommended for non-
priority category, consideration should include the following: (1)
Advanced or tender age; (2) Many years presence in the United
States; (3) Physical or mental condition requiring care or treat-
ment in the States; (4) Family situation in the United States
effect of expulsion; (5) Criminal, Immoral or Subversive activi-
ties or affiliations-recent conduct. If the nonpriority recom-
mendation is approved by the regional commissioner the alien shall
be notified that no action will be taken by the Service to disturb
his immigration status, or that his departure from the United States
has been deferred indefinitely, whichever is appropriate. (Revised)
Each regional commissioner shall submit a quarterly statistical
nonpriority report (Reports Control System Number CCOM-26) to
the Deputy Commissioner which shall be filed in CO 840-P (non-
priority cases). The report shall be forwarded by the 25th day
after the close of the report period and should include: (1) Num-
ber of cases in nonpriority status at the beginning of the quarter;
(2) Number of recommendations received during the quarter; (3)
Number of recommendations denied; (4) Number of recommenda-
tions approved; (5) Number of cases removed from nonpriority
status; (6) Number of nonpriority cases pending at the end of the
quarter. (Added)
See K. DAvis, ADmxNISTRATIvE LAw, CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 474 (5th ed.
1973). INS, OPERATNG INSTRUCTION § 103.1 (a) (1) (ii) (April 30, 1975).
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trary, it is a formalized procedure initiated by a District Director in
accordance with the mandate of the Operations Instruction.33 The
Instruction requires that the District Director "shall" recommend
nonpriority status when there are appealing humanitarian factors.
This is a completely internal procedure of the Service, initiated by
the District Director and acted upon without any input from the
alien himself; the forms are not even available to the public. How-
ever, an attorney aware of the procedure may request such status
on behalf of his client and submit evidence to the local District Di-
rector to substantiate the request that his client be placed in non-
priority status.
Which Categories of Aliens are Eligible for Nonpriority Status?
I have carefully examined the 1843 nonpriority decisions which
constitute the entire body of approved cases as of 31 December 1974.
In virtually any circumstance where following established proce-
dure would result in a grave injustice, nonpriority status is consid-
ered. An alien may achieve nonpriority status regardless of the fac-
tual reasons or statutory grounds for his deportability or excluda-
bility. Nonpriority has been granted to aliens who have committed
serious crimes involving moral turpitude, drug convictions, fraud,
or prostitution. Moreover, nonpriority has been given to Commu-
nists, the insane, the feebleminded, and the medically infirm. In
sum, nonpriority has been granted to those who have violated al-
most any provision of the Act. Often there are multiple grounds
for deportability and ineligibility for other administrative relief.
Table One3 4 provides a breakdown of some of the major categories
33. INS, OPERATING INSTRUCTION § 103.1 (a) (1) (ii) (April 30, 1975).
34. TABLE ONE*
Ground for Deportability
or Excludability Number of Cases Percentage
No immigrant visa** 638 34.6%
Overstay** 430 23.3%
Insanity- 383 20.8%
Criminal convictions**** 168 9.1%
Drug convictions 138 7.5%
Physical health 46 2.5%
Communist 16 .9%
Transporting illegal aliens 14 .8%
Prostitution***** 10 .5%
TOTAL 1843 100.0%• These figures are compiled from the 1843 cases in my possession. The
of aliens granted nonpriority status.
The statistical spread of the cases highlighted in Table One sup-
ports the proposition that any alien, in any category of deportability
or excludability, is eligible for nonpriority status. The cases appear
to hinge on the humanitarian reasons for granting nonpriority
rather than on the original ground of deportability. The most con-
vincing evidence of the relative unimportance of the ground of de-
portability is the following case history (case 12-31) .3c
Subject is a native and citizen of China, 46 years of age.... He
first entered the United States May 19, 1921 as the alien son of a
domiciled Chinese merchant. He made a trip to China in 1935-36
and was absent in Mexico again one day in about 1949 when he fled
to avoid prosecution on a charge of burglary lodged against him in
Seattle, Washington. He was returned to the United States by
Mexican authorities on February 16, 1949. He then gained entry by
falsely claiming birth in the United States. Deportation proceed-
ings were initiated by issuance of a Warrant for Arrest on March
25, 1946 charging deportability for conviction and sentence for rape.
Before completion of these proceedings he departed to Mexico
which invalidated the warrant. Proceedings were again instituted
by issuance of a Warrant for Arrest on April 29, 1949 on the charge
reasons were listed by the district directors on the Form G-312 application
for nonpriority status under "Grounds for Deportability or Exclusion." See
note 32 supra.
** The large majority of cases are technically ones in which the aliens
are overstays or are not in possession of an immigrant visa. Included in
these categories are cases which involve fraudulent entries and entries with-
out inspection; many of these cases also involve some other deportable
ground. The notations on the forms G-312 are often rather cryptic-e.g.,
that the alien is not in possession of an immigrant visa-without stating
exactly why or whether the alien is ineligible to receive such visa for any
reason.
*** Insanity cases include all those in which the alien is ineligible for im-
migration based upon his mental condition-e.g., feeble-mindedness, class
A mental defective, schizophrenic, or likely to become a public charge
within five years of entry.
**** All categories of criminal convictions resulted in ineligibility for an
immigrant visa-e.g., convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, or
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after en-
tering the United States.
***** See Roberts, Sex and the Immigration Laws, 14 SAN DImo L. Ruv.
9, 15-25 (1976) (discussion of criminal convictions involving moral turpi-
tude and prostitution).
35. The case reports furnished to the author consisted of 1843 forms
G-312. The Service claimed that these were not indexed in any particular
fashion at the Central Office, where they were on file. Because the names,
alien registration numbers, and other identifying data had been blacked out,
there was no way to confirm this assertion. The case reports were received
in forty-six packets. Accordingly, the author indexed them in the order
in which they were received-e.g., case 12-3 was received as packet 12, case
'3. The drug cases were indexed separately by number (1 through 138) to
facilitate research with regard to the Lennon case.
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of having been convicted of the crime of rape prior to entry. Dur-
ing the subsequent hearing in 1949 he applied for Suspension of De-
portation which was denied, and he was ordered deported. A new
hearing was held in 1955 resulting in the same decision. A Warrant
for Deportation was issued August 12, 1955.
This subject has a criminal record which includes convictions for
auto theft, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, vagrancy
(pimp), rape, burglary in the second degree, robbery, possession of
narcotics, and numerous other arrests. Despite his lengthy criminal
record and numerous grounds for deportability, he was granted
nonpriority status based upon his subsequent good behavior, suc-
cessful marriage, and the fact that deportation would result in the
separation of a good family unit. Clearly this decision was reached
through strict evaluation of humanitarian factors alone. This prin-
ciple will become clearer as the various categories of humanitarian
factors are considered.
Why is Nonpriority Recommended?
Although the nonpriority category is special, meant to accommo-
date unusual or unique circumstances, an analysis of the cases
demonstrated several discernable categories which were, as a matter
of policy, granted nonpriority status in substantial numbers. Table
Two33 indicates that the elderly, the young, the mentally incompe-
tent, the infirm, and those who would be separated from their
families were treated favorably by the Service.
The Elderly
Elderly aliens for whom deportation proceedings would be a
hardship are usually granted nonpriority status. The equities in
these cases are generally quite obvious. Often these aliens have
been in the United States for extended periods of time. They usu-
36. TABLE Two
Factors Number of cases Percentage
Separation of family 590 32.0%
The young 431 23.4%
The elderly 389 21.1%
The mentally incompetent 357 19.4%
The infirm 48 2.6%
Miscellaneous 28 1.5%
TOTAL 1843 100.0%
ally have no place to go outside this country or would be trauma-
tized by forced departure. In some instances their only living rela-
tives are in the United States, or they are incompetent to some ex-
tent and are being cared for by family members in the United
States. It cannot be overemphasized that the Service, particularly
in these cases, is not impeded by statutory limitations. Rather its
considerations are the real family ties of the people whose lives it
controls.
A typical case is 3-34. The subject is an eighty-year-old Colom-
bian who entered the United States in 1965 as a visitor for pleasure.
She is deportable as an overstay with no administrative relief avail-
able. Her physical and mental condition are described as normal
for one of advanced years.37 A niece and grandniece have under-
taken the care of this elderly woman. Based upon their statements
and the equities involved, nonpriority status was granted.
Quite similar circumstances prevailed in case 26-1. Subject, an
eighty-year-old Portuguese man, was admitted as a visitor for pleas-
ure in 1968 and was deportable in 1970 as an overstay. His only liv-
ing relative is his adopted daughter who lives in the United States
and with whom he now resides. The report states that expulsion
proceedings
would be very detrimental to his physical and mental well-being.
The subject has no visible means of support. He is entirely de-
pendent upon his adopted daughter and her husband, - for
his livelihood. The record indicates that the alien would not be-
come a public charge. Also his age precludes him from entering
the labor market. [The stepdaughter] has been contributing full
support for the past sixteen years. She feels that since she is re-
sponsible for his upkeep, it would be better if the alien were to re-
main in her home.
Nonpriority status was granted.
37. Her case report reads:
Subject has only one sister , residing in Colombia, also age 80
who cannot take care of her. She has no place to return to and
no one to care for her and this would create an extreme hardship
on her in view of her advanced age of 80. The subject is residing
with . a permanent resident alien who immigrated on June
22, 1964 at Miami and who is her niece. The subject previously
resided with - in Colombia until she emigrated to the United
States. . son of - is also a permanent resident alien who
wants to sponsor the subject for his mother. He is employed by
-California as a truck lift operator earning $2.27 per hour for
a 40-hour week, plus overtime. He is single and resides with his
parents, both permanent resident aliens, and the subject at this ad-
dress. He is willing and able to support the subject as he does
his parents and submits an affidavit to the effect she will not be-
come a public charge.
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In some instances nonpriority status has been granted even
though administrative relief was available-e.g., suspension of de-
portation proceedings or the possibility of obtaining an immigrant
visa. Elderly aliens, however, who were incapable of initiating or
following through with the requisite procedures, or refused to do so,
were nevertheless granted nonpriority status. Case 7-29 is just such
a circumstance. A fifty-seven-year-old native of Mexico had en-
tered the United States without inspection and had nine United
States citizen children, ranging in age from two to twenty-nine. Al-
though she is prima facie eligible for registry,38 "[s] he, however, is
mentally unable to apply for such adjustment. She is supported by
welfare and money from her children. She does field work when
available." It was recommended and approved that she be retained
in nonpriority status. This case demonstrates that old age is also
subjectively determined.
In all these cases the overriding humanitarian factors involved
were the advanced age of the alien and the trauma that would re-
sult to the alien if expulsion proceedings were initiated or prose-
cuted. When requested to do so, because of the special character of
the cases, the INS has acted with great compassion and granted non-
priority status.
The Young
The eqiities in dealing with the young are the inverse of those in
dealing with the elderly. When a child is deportable and would be
separated from the friends or relatives who function in the suppor-
tive role of the immediate family, nonpriority may be recom-
mended. Apparently the Service treats children with sympathetic
consideration. Those who are orphans living in institutions, adop-
tive homes, or being cared for by various agencies will not be ex-
pelled. The well-being of the child is considered the primary factor,
and a harmonious homelife is protected if possible.
Case 8-19 is representative. The subject, a fifteen-year-old Mexi-
can national, entered the United States without an immigrant visa.
Although she was statutorily eligible to receive a visa, no adminis-
38. Registry is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970) and in 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.17
& 249 (1976). See Wasserman, Grounds and Procedures Relating to Depor-
tation, 13 SAN DIEGo L. RFv. 125, 138-39 (1975).
trative method assures its issuance.39 This minor, who lived with
her half-brother and his wife, was granted nonpriority status so
that she would not be deprived of adult supervision and care.
With respect to the young, the cases also deal with post-adoles-
cents, people in their twenties, who of course are not technically
children. Even so, some of these individuals have been in the
United States since early childhood and will suffer extreme hard-
ship if expelled to a country with which they have ties only in a
technical sense.
In case 25-32, a twenty-one-year-old Mexican national, in the
United States with her mother, also an illegal alien, was granted
nonpriority status.40 Nonpriority in this case was a device used to
39. The case report reads:
The subject's mother is deceased and her father abandoned her
upon his remarriage in Mexico. The subject was brought to the
U.S. by her half-brother __ who is a naturalized citizen of the
U.S. and employed by the city - She resides with her half-
brother and his family consisting of a wife and four children. She
has no close relatives in Mexico with whom she can stay. The ex-
act whereabouts of her father in Mexico is unknown. The half-
brother stated that he would like to secure an immigrant visa for
the subject. The case was discussed with - Consul of the Visa
Section American Consulate, Cd. Juarez, Chih., Mexico as to
whether he would favorably consider a visa application submitted
in the girl's behalf. The half-brother indicated his willingness to
execute an Affidavit of Support although he appears disinterested
in legally adopting his half-sister. The Consular Officer stated that
in line with the Consulate policy of not accepting Affidavits of Sup-
port from relatives with no legal responsibility, he would refuse
the visa. He also stated that in his opinion the income of the sub-
ject's half-brother, as a city sanitation worker, would be considered
inadequate to support a family of 7, under the Consulate's criteria
of adequacy.
40. The case report describes the difficulties that would result from ex-
pulsion:
This would result in subject and her mother departing this country
after 21 years of United States residence-subject since 8 days of
age-with no home or place to go abroad, or ability to obtain em-
ployment, and inability to obtain immigrant visa for return to the
United States. Subject's case should be considered jointly with
that of her mother . Subject had no knowledge she was not
a citizen of the United States until officers of this Service inter-
viewed her mother in July, 1961. Subject is a student, in eleventh
grade, and is not now employed. She is entirely dependent on her
mother who is employed as a domestic earning $40.00 a week by
the - for support.
Mother and daughter attempted to procure immigrant visas but
were not successful for lack of approved employment letter nnd,
in addition, inability to obtain Mexico passports. H.R. 5939, 88th
Congress, 1st session, for relief of subjects was turned down by the
Subcommittee on Immigration owing to surreptitious entries. They
applied under Section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
in July, 1966 for adjustment of status to permanent residents but
were unable to establish residence in this country since [sic.] prior
to June 30, 1948. They are now not eligible for any type of admin-
istrative relief.
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keep a family unit intact and to protect the emotional well-being of
a young woman and her mother. As with all the cases in this cate-
gory, the Service first seeks to protect the child and then examines
the child's family situation in order to decide upon the application
for the nonpriority program.
The Mentally Incompetent
Like the elderly and the young, the mentally incompetent are a
class of aliens requiring special care and attention. When expulsion
would be a hardship in such cases, nonpriority is generally recom-
mended. This category includes aliens being cared for by family
members or those institutionalized with no place to go outside this
country. Another frequent case is that of the alien who has had an
attack of insanity and is now in a state of remission with a guarded
prognosis. If expulsion would have the effect of possibly causing a
new breakdown or of reversing the remission, nonpriority is
granted.
41
What is significant, if somewhat ironic, is that in most of these
cases the grounds for deportability-e.g., mental defects, institution-
alization after entry-are also grounds for nonpriority consideration
because of the humanitarian factors involved. Thus the Immigra-
tion Service through its nonpriority program seems to be adding
both flexibility and sensitivity to an otherwise indiscriminate and
harsh law.
A related type of mental incompetency case occurs when a family
is granted permanent residence status before it is discovered that
one member (usually a child) is mentally incompetent and thus in-
eligible for permanent residence. Rather than expelling the family
member, nonpriority status is granted.
4 2
41. A representative insanity case is 3-18. The subject, forty-six years
of age at the time of inquiry, had an insanity crisis while living with her
United States citizen husband and children. The report reads:
The subject was a patient at lMass, from 12/5/31
to 3/24/33. She has been at _ since 1/15/53.
Her husband has attempted to defray part of the hospitalization
cost though was compelled to cease payment in August, 1953
because of family obligations. is a minister
whose earnings are small. The hospital authorities are unable
to predict whether recovery is possible.
The recommendation was to retain the case in nonpriority status.
42. This occurred in case 27-32, which involved a twenty-seven-year-old
The Infirm
The Service has a general policy of finding special accommodation
in the nonpriority program for those who are in some manner help-
less and dependent. Within that range of categories are those who
have medical problems. If expulsion would have a serious physical
effect upon the alien or deprive him of needed medical care or the




The largest category of cases involved illegal aliens whose expul-
sion would separate a family unit. The variety of family constella-
tions whose potential breakup would warrant consideration for non-
priority appears to be almost endless. In fact a careful review of
the categories previously discussed would reveal that a high per-
centage of cases involving the elderly, the young, the mentally in-
competent, and the infirm also involves elements of family separa-
tion. What distinguishes those cases from the ones mentioned here
is that in the former, separation is not the essential element war-
ranting nonpriority, while in these cases it is the operative factor.
The most typical case is that of an illegal alien married to a
United States citizen or permanent residence alien. Rarely will
nonpriority status be granted if it involves the "mere" separation of
the husband and wife. The Service apparently believes that sep-
aration of the family unit need not occur in such case, for the spouse
can always leave with the expelled alien. If there are children in-
Canadian national who was deportable because of an attack of insanity
prior to entry. The subject's father and mother were both permanent resi-
dent aliens, and the subject was also a permanent resident. The report
reads:
Hospitalized 3/21/50, released 8/7/50, readmitted 2/4/52 to 3/22/56
and from April 1956 to date. The father is a minister and has lim-
ited income, however, partial payments have been made to the
State. While she has acquired five years for Immigration Act sec-
tion 244(a) (3), relief is not feasible since she is still institution-
alized. She is allowed occasional home visits.
The approved recommendation was to continue in nonpriority status.
43. A typical case is 28-36, in which the subject had polio during child-
hood which continues to affect her muscular coordination and speech. The
report explains:
No family in Guyana. She is maintained by her two United States
citizen sisters who are registered nurses. In the event of expulsion
she would be deprived of her sisters' care and companionship and
support.
Nonpriority was granted.
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volved, however, granting nonpriority is much more likely. This is
so regardless of whether the male or female parent is to be ex-
pelled. When the male is to be expelled, the report is usually
framed in language indicating that the family would be deprived of
paternal support (usually meaning financial support) and care.
Economic factors are less frequently relevant when the female
member is the subject of deportation proceedings, although this is
not always true.
A representative case is 1-12, in which the subject was a Mexican
national, without an immigrant visa, who had a permanent resident
husband and several United States citizen children. The report
states the expulsion would "[r]esult in the separation of subject
from her children in the United States. She has no means of sup-
port in Mexico." Nonpriority status was granted despite her previ-
ous separation from her husband and the fact that she was on wel-
fare.
Cases occur in which the relationship is not a legal one, such as
case 1-32. The report describes the subject as separated from her
husband, living with another man who is a United States citizen,
and having several children through each relationship. In case 3-46
the subject's husband was in jail. Because her departure would re-
quire leaving her children with someone else, nonpriority was
granted.
The equities of the cases are not limited only to family separation;
on the contrary other compassionate elements usually exist. The
most frequent is economic hardship. There are others-e.g., case 2-
35-reflecting unusual circumstances involved in the most frequent
kind of separation case, the separation of parents from a child.4 4 In
this case nonpriority status was granted to keep a mother in the
court district having jurisdiction over her children.
44. The report reads:
Subject would be removed from the Court district having jurisdic-
tion of her children. Civil authorities advise that family may be
rehabilitated and reunited. The subject's husband, -, a Staff
Sergeant in the U.S. Air Force, is presently serving a 2-year prison
term in Leavenworth, Kansas, on conviction of sodomy. The case
was brought to light by the subject reporting to the Air Police that
her husband was forcing her child to be involved in abnormal sex-
ual behavior, which included the subject, her husband and child.
,Subject is again pregnant and delivery is expected shortly.
Miscellaneous Factors
Unusual circumstances comprising various diverse factors and in-
dividual situations could potentially give rise to nonpriority classifi-
cation. One such category of cases involves those technically eligi-
ble for immigrant visas but for economic reasons unable to obtain
them at a United States Consulate. Thus an illegal alien presently
in the United States who cannot afford the airfare to get back to his
country for a visa interview at the Consulate may be granted non-
priority to avoid an unnecessary hardship.
Another factor considered is the educational welfare of children.
A mother who is subject to expulsion and who would be required
to move her children from United States' schools, particularly if
they are United States citizen-children, may be granted nonpriority
status.
Adverse publicity is a factor which is mentioned in the reports of
approximately twenty cases (1.1%) and is implicit in many others.
Typical instances are the wife of an American soldier killed in the
Vietnam War or the family which has been involved in a well-pub-
licized hardship. A related type of case is that of the elderly Chi-
nese who confess their illegal status in the United States as part of
the Chinese confession program and are granted nonpriority status
in order to encourage such confessions within the Chinese commu-
nity on the West Coast.
What Effect Does the Immigration Status of Family Members
Have?
Although the majority of cases involved families with at least
one United States citizen member, clearly this situation is not a
prerequisite. In fact, contrary to popular thought, it plays only
a minor role in consideration for nonpriority classification.
4"
No United States citizen family member was involved in 36.8 per-
cent of the cases. In many cases citizenship was not relevant
45. TABLE THREE
Status of Family Members
Number of Cases Percentage
United States Citizen 867 47.0%
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and was noted only in the informational background portion of the
required application forms.
The citizenship status of a family member appeared relevant in
cases in which expulsion of the subject would result in separation
and other hardship to the family member. In these cases the Serv-
ice does not want to force the United States citizen to choose be-
tween leaving the country or remaining but being separated from
loved ones. Because the same consideration is given to permanent
resident aliens, especially if they have been in the United States for
any appreciable length of time, status is not a significant factor.
The Drug Cases
The author's original interest in obtaining the nonpriority data
was to ascertain whether the denial of nonpriority status to Lennon,
who had been convicted in Britain of marijuana possession, was in
keeping with the general policies of the INS with regard to the ap-
plication of the nonpriority program. Thus, special attention was
given to cases which involved drug convictions. Indeed, the in-
tractable provisions of the immigration law relating to the deporta-
tion and exclusion of aliens with even minor drug offenses made the
remedy of nonpriority classification particularly appropriate in
many cases.
There were 138 cases of aliens with previous drug convictions.
These cases range from simple possession of marijuana, the lightest
offense, to heavy trafficking in heroin and cocaine, the more serious
offenses. Many involved multiple offenders. As was previously es-
tablished with regard to all classifications of deportable aliens, these
cases were found to have been accorded nonpriority status regard-
less of the seriousness of the previous offense. In fact, aliens with
narcotics convictions were granted nonpriority status although they
had also been convicted of murder, had been described as the "larg-
est supplier of marijuana and narcotics in the area," were
an admitted heroin addict, "using approximately eighteen grams of
heroin a day," and had even been convicted of selling and possessing
* Family members who are both United States citizens and permanent res-
ident aliens.
** Cases of families in which there is no member in status.
cocaine. As with the other categories, nonpriority was granted
based upon the various humanitarian considerations involved.40
Table Four47 shows that the same types of humanitarian factors
which were the basis for granting nonpriority status in cases of de-
portable aliens in general are applicable also to drug cases. Youth
is a consideration in few drug cases, and the factor of insanity does
not appear at all. This situation does not reflect a low approval rate
for requests from the young and the insane, but rather demon-
strates the rarity of such cases occurring in the first instance. Most
nonpriority youth cases involve children of extremely tender years
who are not involved in narcotic convictions, and the insane are not
likely to have drug convictions. The major categories of aliens
granted nonpriority status in the drug cases are those involving
family separation and the elderly.
As part of this study, figures under the broad category of "Sep-
aration" were also compiled. Although fifty-seven of the cases in-
volved both separation and economic factors, a substantial number
of separation cases involved no economic factors at all. Typical was
case 9-8, involving a young man who was recommended for nonpri-
ority status because expulsion "would separate subject from his
lawful resident wife and United States citizen child. It would be a
hardship on all of them to be separated and they are a well-adjusted
family and devoted to each other." When he was twenty-four years
old, the alien had been convicted of transporting marijuana. Not
unlike Lennon, he was reported to be a person of higher caliber in
spite of his conviction and is referred to as being "respected by peo-
ple who know him .... He is a good husband and a good father."
No other humanitarian factors appear in the record of this case. Ap-
parently the fact that one of the grounds for potential expulsion is
a drug offense is not significant in the determination of nonpriority
status.
In light of these considerations, perhaps the best statement con-
cerning the nonpriority category is that it is the Immigration Serv-
46. TABLE FouR
The Drug Cases
Factors Number of Cases Percentage
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ice's ad hoc balancing device. It accommodates the individual ali-
en's human needs and concerns to the harsh, often immutable condi-
tions of the immigration law. Because of the commendable pur-
poses and motivations which must have engendered this spontane-
ous humanitarian program, it is an anomaly why this procedure was
hidden so thoroughly from public knowledge and its operation so
shrouded in mystery. Its very existence demonstrates how an ad-
ministrative agency, required by law to enforce a harsh mandate,
can at the same time be sensitive to the possible tragic consequences
of that mandate and find means to ameliorate them.48
One can only speculate about the reasons that the Government
enshrouded the nonpriority program in a mantle of secrecy. It is
quite possible that the Government wished to achieve the broadest
discretion, free even of the restraint of stare decisis. Perhaps
through nondisclosure the Government hoped to establish a discre-
tionary realm free of any judicial restraint whatsoever, even as to
potential claims concerning abuse of discretion. However, because
the program provided potential grist for claims of ultra-vires action
on the part of Government officials, it is equally possible that the
Government election to keep the program secret was based upon
its desire not to be challenged for having exceeded its statutory
mandate. Nonpriority case records which disclose prior applica-
tions for suspension of deportation which were unsuccessful before
the Congress illustrate the potential for claims that the entire pro-
gram was beyond the authority of the INS. In the final analysis,
however, it is clear that the Attorney General has sufficient author-
ity under the statute upon which to ground a program of uniformly
administered deferred departure.
Use of Published Nonpriority Decisions
Now that most of the information concerning the nonpriority pro-
gram is available to the public, exploring how it can best be used
48. The only other judicial reference to the nonpriority program found
by the author was in an unreported decision, Riva v. INS, Civil No. 74-
1601 (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1973), in which the court stated that the exercise of
discretion in the nonpriority program was unreviewable. Lennon v. United
States, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), held that the court would review the
mala fide selective use of the deportation process in a proper case and au-
thorized Lennon to conduct limited discovery proceedings to prove his alle-
gations that the Government had purposely failed to consider nonpriority
classification and had proceeded to deport him for reasons which abridged
his constitutional rights.
is worthwhile. As was explained49 when the 1,843 cases in the Cen-
tral Office of the INS were obtained, they were organized in no dis-
cernible manner. Clearly evident from the procedure used by the
Central Office Nonpriority Committee to decide these cases"° is the
fact that stare decisis did not play a role. Requests for nonpriority
classification were decided on a case-by-case basis without reference
to previous decisions. They were decided on the equities of indi-
vidual cases, with the Central Office basing its decisions upon INS
guidelines.51 At present, because cases are decided at the regional
level,52 four separate files of nonpriority cases exist 3-one in each
of the four regional INS offices.
Despite the fact that the principles of stare decisis are not for-
mally used in such cases, tables5 4 clearly demonstrate that distinct
criteria are used in deciding nonpriority cases. Thus, the practi-
tioner can cull from the now-published records cases whose fact
patterns compare in significant detail with his own client's case.
The previous decisions will support by analogy his arguments in ap-
plications for nonpriority consideration. Because these records re-
flect a consistent application of the policies described in the Opera-
tions Instraction,5 5 their presentation should have great influence
in determining the outcome of nonpriority applications. Although
a refusal to follow the previous nonpriority cases might not be a vi-
olation of the principle of stare decisis, it might constitute such a de-
viation from the accepted standards and policies of the administra-
tive agency as to be equally unacceptable."0
49. See note 35 supra.
50. This conclusion is not based on any direct indications from immigra-
tion officials. Apparently nonpriority applications were decided on a case-
by-case basis. Until this time the entire nonpriority procedure was strictly
an internal function of the agency. Especially because there has been no
input whatsoever from applicants or their attorneys until recent years and
because the records were not tabulated, it is assumed that decisions were
made informally on a case-to-case method. The first known systemization
and categorization of nonpriority cases was made and published in Wildes,
supra note *.
51. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 29 supra. At present the Immigration
Service has four regional offices. The Northeast Regional Office is at Bur-
lington, Vermont; the Northwest Regional Office is at St. Paul, Minnesota;
the Southwest Regional Office is at San Pedro, California; and the South-
east Regional Office is at Richmond, Virginia. For a description of the
functions of the regional offices, see C. GoRwoN & H. ROSENFIELD, ImmIGRA-
TioN LAW & Pnocmuiw § 1.9 (b), at 1-40 (rev. ed. 1975).
53. See note 32 supra.
54. See notes 34, 36, 45, & 46 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 32-52 supra.
56. Although the federal courts have very limited jurisdiction to review
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Our analysis of the possible abuses of discretion inherent in the
decisionmaking process of the District Director in recommending
nonpriority is complicated by some unique procedural features of
the nonpriority application process. Although an alien may re-
quest, through his attorney, that he be considered for nonpriority
status, no formal mechanism exists to request or apply for this kind
of consideration. The INS views this program as an intra-agency
operation initiated not by any outside request but rather through
the initiative of the District Director. Furthermore, a recommenda-
tion for nonpriority can be initiated by the District Director at any
stage of any immigration proceeding before or after a deportation
order has been issued. Consequently, even though it might be very
clear that according to the established INS policies and procedures,
a particular alien warrants nonpriority consideration, it would nev-
ertheless be difficult to pinpoint at what juncture the District Di-
rector has committed an abuse of discretion through his failure to
recommend nonpriority.
Apparently, once an alien makes an application or request for
nonpriority consideration, bringing to the attention of the District
Director all the factors which he considers relevant to such classi-
fication, a duty is imposed upon the Director to act in accordance
with the procedures outlined in the Operations Instruction. It
could also be argued, however, that the purpose of the nonpriority
program is to avoid adverse action when the circumstances warrant
it and that until such adverse action is imminent, the District Di-
rector has not abused his discretion. This writer believes that the
second argument is fallacious as no purpose is served by delaying
the recommendation until adverse action is imminent. Delay serves
only to place the applicant in a position of great disadvantage. He
is left on tenterhooks until the very last minute, not knowing
whether an edict will issue to spare him from misfortune. More-
discretionary decisions of administrative officials, they are permitted to re-
view an action which would constitute an abuse of discretion. They may
thus review decisions which are arbitrary or capricious. See Rassano v.
INS, 492 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 1113 (1975). There-
fore, a failure on the part of the District Director to adhere to an established
pattern might indicate caprice and might be an abuse of discretion. See
Lum Wan v. Esperdy, 321 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Dimaren v.
INS, 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which it was ruled that an inex-
plicable departure from established policies would indicate an abuse of dis-
cretion.
over, it is established from the decided cases that the INS has not
had a policy to defer nonpriority decisions to the last possible mo-
ment. Assistant Commissioner Loughran, in a letter dated July 16,
1973, describes the policy of the INS as requiring an attempt to
identify cases warranting nonpriority as early as possible in the pro-
ceeding. Thus, it would seem an abuse of discretion for the District
Director not to recommend nonpriority status if (a) the equities
present in the particular applicant's situation at the time are those
which the INS has, as a matter of policy, determined sufficient to
warrant nonpriority recommendation, and (b) the circumstances
have come to or been brought to the attention of the District Di-
rector. Query whether an action in mandamus or for declaratory
relief would lie to challenge this abuse of discretion.
LITIGATIVE USE OF THE FIpEEDOm OF INFORMATION ACT
The preceding pages have outlined how the FOIA was success-
fully used in the context of an immigration case to uncover valuable
information and make it available to the public.5 7 During the
course of the same litigation, an attempt was made to use the FOIA
in a completely different way. Although it was not successful, the
issues raised introduced some intriguing and exciting possibilities
for future immigration practice. While Lennon's deportation pro-
ceeding was on appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), Lennon made a motion in the FOIA action to enjoin and
prohibit the INS from finalizing the deportation order and from
closing the administrative record as well as from taking any in-
tended action to enforce his removal from the United States, pend-
ing the disclosure of the information sought under the FOIA. The
thrust of the motion was to maintain the status quo while obtaining
needed information so that it might be filed with the Board as a
supplemental brief and thus be included in the administrative rec-
ord for eventual judicial review. Thus this was a request to stay
the administrative process until such time that the information re-
quested in the FOIA action was made available. 8
The leading case on this issue is Renegotiation Board v. Banner-
57. As mentioned above, this action is not completed. The author is at-
tempting to obtain information regarding the nonpriority applications which
were denied. In a pretrial conference with Judge Owen on May 25, 1976,
the judge indicated that despite the fact that Lennon had already obtained
nonpriority status, plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to this information.
The Government has not opposed this position.
58. This procedure should be distinguished from a stay-of-deportation
proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). See Wasserman, Practical As-
pects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAx Di _o L.
Rv. 111, 125-26 (1976).
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craft Corp.59 In Bannercraft the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit sustained the granting of injunctions by the
district court that restrained the agency involved from continuing
the administrative process pending the outcome of the FOIA litiga-
tion. Plaintiffs in the FOIA action were contractors whose con-
tract was subject to renegotiation in administrative proceedings
provided by law before the Renegotiation Board. They filed proper
requests for the documents with the Renegotiation Board, but in
each case their requests were rejected. The Renegotiation Board re-
lied on one or more of the exemptions contained in the FOIA as a
ground for rejecting the requests. The contractors successfully ar-
gued before the district court that an injunction was essential in or-
der to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable injury.
Specifically, they claimed that without an injunction, the renegotia-
tion process would be completed long before the status of the dis-
puted documents could be determined. The court of appeals found
that
although completion of renegotiation would not formally moot the
controversy, appellees contended it would frustrate the purpose of
the Information Act by depriving them of access to the documents
during the period when such access would be useful6o
The Renegotiation Board argued that the FOIA nowhere con-
ferred jurisdiction on trial judges to enjoin Board proceedings. It
also argued, in the alternative, that even if such authority to enjoin
Board proceedings existed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies precluded equitable intervention in ongoing adminis-
trative procedures. However, the Board's arguments were rejected
by the circuit court of appeals.
We hold that the FOIA does confer jurisdiction on District Courts
to enjoin administrative proceedings pending a judicial determina-
tion of the applicability of the Information Act to documents in-
volved in those proceedings. We further hold that the exhaustion
doctrine causes no obstacle to issuance of such an injunction in a
proper case. 61
Despite the fact that the FOTA does not in explicit terms grant ju-
risdiction to enjoin agency proceedings either pending the produc-
59. 415 U.S. 1 (1974). See also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950 (1974).
60. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
61. Id. at 349.
tion of documents or until their status is decided, the court held that
such authority is within its general equity powers.0 2 The court
found that among equity's oldest inherent powers is the authority
to preserve the status quo pending a judicial review of the merits.00
The court further distinguished the doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies as not being a jurisdictional matter but
rather one which went to the timing of the action and noted that
courts can reach the merits of administrative proceedings despite
the existence of unexhausted administrative remedies.0 4 It held
further that there was a showing of irreparable injury, a normal re-
quirement in equity for the issuance of an injunction, for plaintiffs
would be required to renegotiate contracts without access to impor-
tant relevant documents. The court reasoned that even assuming
that the damage could somehow be undone at a later stage of the
proceedings and despite the fact that the statute involved vested an
exclusive power in the Court of Claims to hear the matter de novo,
neither the Renegotiation Board nor the Court of Claims has au-
thority to correct errors made under the FOIA because such author-
ity was vested exclusively in the district courts.6
While Lennon's motion for a stay of his deportation proceedings
was pending in the district court, the Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court's holding that in this specific circumstance plaintiff
was entitled to an injunction. The Supreme Court's 5-to-4 decision
did not limit in any way the jurisdiction of a district court to issue
an injunction in a proper case in order to preserve the status quo.06
By its own terms, it was limited to the issuance of injunctions
62. As the Act's history makes clear, Congress was also troubled by
the plight of those forced to litigate with agencies on the basis of
secret laws or incomplete information .... When this subsidiary
statutory purpose is kept in mind, the possibility that Congress in-
tended to authorize injunctions against pending administrative pro-
ceedings until secret records are revealed or their status deter-
mined, seems less unlikely.
Id. at 352.
63. Since temporary stays of pending administrative procedures may
be necessary on occasion to enforce the policy of the FOIA, we hold
that the District Court has jurisdiction to issue such stays.
Id. at 354.
64. See K. DAvis, 3 AmIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISS § 20.10 (1959).
65. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 358 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), rev'd U.S. 1 (1974).
66. Accord, Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); ML DAVIs, ADmnISTRATnm LAW OF THE SEvENES § 3A.6-1, at 64
(Supp. 1976); Comment, Restraint of Agency Proceedings Under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 191, 200 (1975); Casenote,
Administrative Law-Freedom of Information Act, 3 FoRDHAm Unn3x L.J.
359,368 (1975).
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against the Renegotiation Board.67 The Court expressly affirmed
that a district court has equitable jurisdiction under the FOIA to
enjoin agency action in a proper case.
With the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district
court by section 552 (a), there is little to suggest despite the Act's
primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers
of an equity Court.68
The Bannercraft decision left undetermined exactly which cir-
cumstances would justify a judicial stay of administrative proceed-
ings pending the outcome of a FOIA action. However, the decision
seems to indicate that courts should be guided mainly by the legisla-
tive history and purpose of the pertinent enabling statute. The
Court would not permit interferences with the Renegotiation Act's
"purposeful design of negotiation without interruption for judicial
review."0' 9 Relying on this understanding of the Renegotiation Act
and buttressed by past interpretation of that Act, 0 the Court re-
quired exhaustion of administrative remedies before access to the
courts would be allowed with respect to contract negotiation before
the Renegotiation Board. However, the Court's holding was limited
to this particular issue before this specific agency.
The situation in which Lennon found himself was significantly
different from that of plaintiffs in Bannercraft. Lennon was on the
brink of having a deportation order administratively finalized
against him in proceedings before the BIA, acting in accordance
with a mandate derived from the Immigration and Naturalization
Act71-an Act very different from the Renegotiation Act. It was
67. We find it unnecessary, however, to decide in these cases,
whether or under what circumstances, it would be proper for the
district court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin agency action pend-
ing the resolution of an asserted FOIA claim. We hold only that
in a renegotiation case, the contractor is obliged to pursue its ad-
ministrative remedy, and when it fails to do so may not attain its
ends through the route of judicial interference. The nature of the
renegotiation process mandates this result, and were it otherwise,
the effect would be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be sup-
planted and defeated by an FOIA suit.
415 U.S. at 20.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22; see K. DAVIs, supra note 66 (suggests that 1974 FOIA
amendments ameliorate this concern).
70. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel
Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, S31 U.S. 752 (1947); MacCauley v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946).
71. The procedure for determining deportability of an alien is found in
submitted that Lennon was subject to circumstances in which a stay
of the administrative proceeding would be appropriate.72 The rene-
gotiation and the deportation processes are distinguishable in sev-
eral significant respects. 78
Judicial Review
The Renegotiation Act provides for de novo proceeding in the
Court of Claims, unfettered by any prejudice which might arise
from the agency proceeding and free from any presumption that the
Renegotiation Board's determination is supported by substantial ev-
idence. The Immigration and Nationality Act specifically desig-
nates the Petition for Review to be "determined solely upon the ad-
ministrative record upon which the deportation order is based and
the Attorney General's findings of fact. ' 74 The Act requires a de-
termination that the Immigration Service's findings be "supported
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole. ' 75 If the plaintiff were permitted to expand
his brief on appeal to include information disclosed pursuant to the
FOIA action, a motion for a preliminary injunction would perhaps
be unnecessary. However, as the Act specifically provides, 70 appeal
of a deportation order is limited strictly to the administrative rec-
ord. Thus, a failure to stay the proceedings could clearly cause
irreparable harm. 77 Moreover, unlike the Immigration Act, the
section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1970).
72. For analysis of the Bannercraft decision and some suggestions about
the extent to which stays of administrative proceedings have been limited,
see Comment, supra note 66; Casenote, supra note 66.
See generally Recent Decision, Administrative Law-Freedom of In-
formation Act, 41 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1072, 1081 (1973) (district court should
have jurisdiction to issue stay as an incident of its FOIA subsection (a) (3)
jurisdiction); Casenote, Administrative Law-Freedom of Information Act,
51 TEXAs L. Ray. 757, 767 (1973) (issuance of a stay conforms to the congres-
sional policy of full disclosure); Recent Development, Administrative Law
-Freedom of Information Act, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 180, 192 (recommends that
a showing of probable success on the merits be a prerequisite for an injunc-
tion to issue).
73. See text accompanying notes 74-94 infra.
74. Immigration & Nationality Act, § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1970).
75. Id. § 106 (a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1106 (a) (4).
76. Id.
77. Cases standing for the principle that deportation visits great hardship
upon an alien are innumerable. The Supreme Court has said that deporta-
tion may constitute as severe a punishment as loss of livelihood. Delgadillo
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947). As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court in Ng Fund H. v. White, "deportation may result
in a loss of all that makes life worth living." 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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Renegotiation Act allows litigants the usual rights of discovery in
proceedings before -the Court of Claims. Regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Immigration Act do not permit a respondent to sub-
poena a witness in his own behalf in deportation proceedings;78 nor




As expressed by Congress,80 the purpose of the Renegotiation Act
is to allow the process of renegotiation to continue at various levels
without reference to prior decisions. Of course, time was not a ma-
jor factor because the contract being renegotiated had already been
executed. The Immigration Act, however, established a process of
confrontation (as contrasted with negotiation) with a premium
placed upon the prompt removal of deportable aliens from the
United States.8 ' In fact, the purpose of judicial review under sec-
tion 106 (a) of the Immigration Act is to supplant and replace the
many different methods, often dilatory and indirect, previously
used to secure review of deportation orders.82 The procedure was
intended to stream-line the removal process to a one-step confronta-
tion, based upon an exact and complete administrative record. The
necessity of a complete and all-inclusive record demands that any
action by the Government to finalize the record in incomplete form
be enjoined and prohibited by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, a stay of the administrative process in an immigration case
under appropriate circumstances would be an accommodation to the
congressional intent in passing the Immigration Act and would thus
be an appropriate use of the court's equity powers.83
78. 8 C.F.R. § 287.4(a) (2) (1976).
79. Immigration & Nationality Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1106 (1970).
80. See S. REP. No. 92-245, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted at 117
CONG. REc. 22879 (1971), for a discussion of the lengthy procedure involved
in renegotiation. See also 18 RENFGOTiATION BD., ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1973).
81. See H. REP. No. 1086, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1961). Moreover, a de-
portation proceeding is basically irreversible because a court cannot review
the deportation once the alien leaves the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (a)
(1970). Thus once an alien is deported, subsequently developed informa-
tion is of little assistance.
82. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIEW, 2 IMMGRATION LAw & PnocEDUPE
§ 8.2 (rev. ed. 1975).
83. The 1974 FOIA amendment puts a premium on prompt reply to
requests for records. See note 9 supra. This emphasis supports the con-
Although these arguments are persuasive, the issue is less clear in
any attempt to apply them to the nonpriority program of the INS.
The status of this program is indefinite within the agency itself.
The Government has contended that the decision to classify a case
as nonpriority is analogous to the decision of a prosecutor not to
prosecute a case and that such matters are determined in the abso-
lute discretion of the prosecutor. The courts have thus far not in-
terfered.8 4 Furthermore, the Government contended in Lennon
that the issue of nonpriority consideration is one which cannot ap-
propriately be brought before the BIA and that stay of the BIA's
proceedings would thus serve no purpose.
These are admittedly complicated issues. However, the analogy
drawn between this agency procedure and a prosecutor's discretion
about which cases should be prosecuted is faulty. If any analogy is
to be made, it is between the nonpriority program and the typical
stay of an alien's deportation. The decision not to act upon a depor-
tation order or not to prosecute a deportation case by placing it in
a nonpriority category is never final or permanent. Rather it is
limited to a fixed period of time,85 reviewed periodically, 0 and is
subject to change when the criteria which warranted nonpriority
treatment in the first instance no longer exist.87 The decisionmak-
hmg process in the prosecutor's office is usually a single and final de-
termination about whether a case is worthy of prosecution. The
prosecutor's decision not to proceed with the case is not a device
providing temporary relief for a fixed period of time and subject to
review, based upon individual equities; it is definitely not a special
program of any kind. Regarding the Government's second point-
while it is true that the issue of nonpriority consideration had never
previously come before the BIA, it is also true that potential liti-
gants were never aware that such a program existed. Including the
issues raised by the nonpriority program in the context of a depor-
tation proceeding before an immigration judge and subsequently
tention that the lawmakers intended FOIA benefits to be available quickly
to allow for its use at a time when it could still benefit the requestor.
84. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d
375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967). The Government contended that
the determination to grant or deny nonpriority status is a matter of com-
plete discretion which is not subject to judicial review and even if it were
subject to judicial review, that review would be narrowly limited to
whether the decision constituted an abuse of discretion. See Wong Wing
Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). See also note 56 supra.
85. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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before the BIA is appropriate because of the program's relevance
to the substance and issues involved in the deportation proceeding.
In the Lennon litigation, persuaded by the Government's conten-
tion that no irreparable harm had been done to the plaintiff and re-
lying upon the immigration judge's contention that matters regard-
ing the nonpriority program were irrelevant,88 District Court Judge
Richard Owen refused to grant the injunction. Judge Owen argued
that:
If that ruling is proper, there is no basis for an injunction to permit
plaintiff to obtain these records to introduce in that proceeding. If
it is improper, either the [BIA] or the Court of Appeals may re-
verse with appropriate directions to the Immigration Judge to re-
ceive and consider such proof.8 9
Judge Owen was unwilling to issue an injunction, given the possi-
bility, however remote, that another forum might fashion an appro-
priate remedy. He clearly relied heavily on the language in Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 9° which he quoted in his opinion:
[I]t is only in extraordinary circumstances that a court may, in the
sound exercise of discretion, intervene to interrupt an agency pro-
ceeding to dispose of a single intermediate or collateral issue. A
cogent showing of irreparable harm is an indispensable condition of
such intervention. 91
Judge Owen's restrictive ruling may have missed the essential is-
sue. He made the assumption that if it were appropriate for the
INS to act upon a nonpriority application, neither the Board nor the
court of appeals would take jurisdiction of this matter and fashion
the appropriate remedy. However, both these bodies could con-
clude that the immigration judge was right in that the issue of non-
priority status is not one appropriately within their jurisdiction. If
that were the case, the plaintiff would truly have suffered irrepara-
ble harm.
Indeed, the plaintiff's essential claim is that he is being selectively
prosecuted. In essence, he claims that the reason that his nonprior-
ity application remained unadjudicated was that the agency was
acting improperly. Thus, a situation would exist in which an order
88. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
90. 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950 (1974).
91. Id. at 93 as quoted in Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39, 41-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
of deportation was to be reviewed on several judicial levels, osten-
sibly based upon the legal and factual issues in the case, while plain-
tiff claims that the entire record upon which they purport to decide
the case is a sham. If the plaintiff must allow this procedure to con-
tinue without benefit of a stay of deportation, he has no alternative
but to resort to a collateral action in a district court to resolve the
matter of selective prosecution. However, such a collateral action
can in no way prevent the INS from deporting the alien while the
selective prosecution action continues in the district court unless
the district court is willing to stay the deportation proceeding.
0 2
Once the plaintiff has been deported, his chances of overcoming the
negative determination of the INS become almost negligible.0 8
When collateral issues which challenge the entire administrative
process being pursued are at issue, a stay of the administrative pro-
ceeding would be most appropriate. This would also have the effect
of properly placing the evidence of the alleged abuses before the
circuit court of appeals as part of the record on appeal, thus en-
abling the court to determine whether this vital issue was properly
within its jurisdiction. The court of appeals, of course, has author-
ity to stay deportation until the appropriate action is taken.94
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately the question of whether a stay of administrative
procedures would be appropriate in an immigration case was never
answered in Lennon. The writer nevertheless anticipates that in-
evitably these issues will arise in future litigation by other aliens
before the INS.0 5 Whether such litigation involves the nonpriority
92. No specific immigration statute empowers a federal district court to
stay a deportation proceeding while a collateral action is being pursued.
93. An alien once deported has considerably less ability to protect his
rights regarding presence in the United States. First, a past deportation
is a ground for exclusion from the United States. Immigration and Nation-
ality Act § 212(a) (17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (17) (1970). Furthermore once
outside the United States, the alien must apply to a consular official for
a visa. A consular official's denial of a visa is not subject to judicial review.
See United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
But see Wildes, Review of Denial of Visa, 46 INTERPRETER RELEASES (1969).
Also note that in an exclusion hearing before the INS, the burden of proof
is on the alien to establish his eligibility for admission. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1105
(a) (1970) provides that an alien who has departed from the United States
cannot obtain judicial review of the deportation order.
94. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (3)
(1970), provides that the serving of a petition for review automatically
stays the deportation of the alien unless the court otherwise directs.
95. An attempt was made to obtain a stay of administrative procedure
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program or some other collateral issue affecting the rights of an
alien subject to deportation, no question exists in this writer's mind
that the FOIA will have an active role to play in such litigation.96
in an action in the district court by a claim that the attorney general had
prejudged an immigration case in Bufalino v. Kennedy, 323 F.2d 1016 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). See also Attorney General v. Bufalino, 371 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir,
1966).
96. In the summer of 1975, the INS consented to have Lennon's applica-
tion for nonpriority status reconsidered by an official who had no previous
connection with the case. In September 1975, days before the date set for
oral arguments in the court of appeals action, the author's office was in-
formed by telephone by the District Office in New York that Lennon had
been granted nonpriority status. The decision became moot when the court
of appeals reversed the BIA's decision which had ordered Lennon's depor-
tation. Lennon received his green card on July 27, 1976. See note 4 supra.
